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28 JAN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Cyprus Post-Mortem Report

1. The attached Cyprus Post-Mortem is being distributed to USIB members for their review. Please note that, in response to your comments on an earlier draft, we added paragraph 11 to the Principal Findings section.

2. I recommend that you call attention to the report at a future USIB meeting and note, for the members' consideration, the following major recommendations drawn from the Principal Findings section of the post-mortem:

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[REDACTED] This inability to foresee critical events -- in the face of mounting evidence -- seems to rest in part on the familiar analytical bias that ultimately reason and rationality will prevail. We recommend the further development of training techniques which will help the analyst recognize and overcome his prejudices, and we encourage the establishment of a system of devil's advocacy as a means to challenge conventional analytical wisdom.

-- Analysis during the Cyprus crisis suffered because key categories of information were not available, specifically those associated with private conversations between US policy makers and their representatives on the scene and between these policy makers and principals in the dispute. This potentially serious problem should be addressed by the intelligence community and by policy makers as well.

-- A final major problem identified by the post-mortem report concerned the intelligence community's procedures during the crisis. Consumers complained that there were too many crisis reports issued by the various community agencies with too much information. Therefore, the post-mortem recommends

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that during future crises the community issue a single, national situation report, the feasibility of which, as you know, is currently being tested. Furthermore, the format of crisis products should be altered to highlight critical information and to put the details of fast-breaking situations in perspective. Emphasis should be placed on assessing the meaning of events rather than on reporting the events themselves.

*/s/ Richard W. Shryock*

R. W. Shryock  
Chief, Product Review Division  
Intelligence Community Staff

Attachment - As Stated

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